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An Empirical Analysis on the Public Good Characteristics of the ROK-US Alliance | |
Àú ÀÚ | ±è´ë¿µ,½Å¿ëµµ |
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Ãâ ó | Vol 6 |
¹ßÇà ³âµµ | 2019 |
ÁÖÁ¦ Å°¿öµå | Çѹ̵¿¸ÍÁÖÇѹ̱º ¹æÀ§ºñ ºÐ´ã±Ý°ø°øÀçNash-Cournot ProcessLindahl Process |
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The purpose of this study is to analyze the public good characteristics of the ROK-US alliance. Empirical results, regarding the USFK burden sharing data, are as follows. Firstly, a Nash-Cournot process (N-process) outperforms a Lindahl process (L-process) in both countries. Secondly, the public good characteristics of the ROK-US alliance is empirically explained by the joint product model including the private defense good, not by the pure public good model. Unlike a cooperative Lindahl resource allocation process, the free riding problem happens in a competitive Nash-Cournot process to induce the incentive of reallocating burden sharing. It is difficult to figure out the exclusive security benefit from the private security good in the Nash-Cournot joint product model. Then it is not proper to argue the ROK¡¯s free riding on the US defense. However, considering that a Rindahl process provides a Pareto optimal equilibrium in resource allocation, it is necessary for the ROK and the US to reveal true preferences for public goods in future cost-sharing talks in order to determine their portions of defense burden. |