1. ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÃÖÁ¾»óÅ ÇÙ À§Çù Æò°¡¿Í Çѱ¹ÀÇ ±º»ç´ëºñż¼ º¸¿Ï
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ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÃÖÁ¾»óÅ ÇÙ À§Çù Æò°¡¿Í Çѱ¹ÀÇ ±º»ç´ëºñż¼ º¸¿Ï |
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The Evaluation of North Korea¡¯s End State Nuclear Threat and ROK¡¯s Readiness Posture |
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ºÏÇÑ ÇÙ À§Çù, 3Ãà Àü·«, ÇÑ¹Ì ¸ÂÃãÇü ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«, ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ÇÙ¿ì»ê, ¼±Á¦Å¸°Ý, Çѱ¹Çü ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦Àü·« |
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ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ °³¹ßÀÌ ÇöÀç Ãß¼¼´ë·Î °è¼ÓµÈ´Ù¸é, ¸ÓÁö¾Ê¾Æ ¿ì¸®´Â ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÃÖÁ¾»óÅ ÇÙ À§Çù¿¡ Á÷¸éÇÏ°Ô µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
º» ¿¬±¸´Â ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÃÖÁ¾»óÅ ÇÙ À§Çù¿¡ ´ëºñÇÑ ¿ì¸® ±ºÀÇ ±º»ç´ëºñż¼¸¦ Áø´ÜÇÏ¿© ±× Ãë¾à¼ºÀ» º¸¿ÏÇϴµ¥ ¿¬±¸ÀÇ ¸ñÀûÀ» µÎ¾ú´Ù. À̸¦ À§ÇØ ¸ÕÀú ºÏÇÑ ÇÙ À§Çù¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Çѱ¹±ºÀÇ ¾ç´ë ´ëºñÃ¥ÀÎ 3Ãà Àü·«°ú ÇÑ¹Ì ¸ÂÃãÇü ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«À» ÁýÁßÀûÀ¸·Î ºÐ¼®ÇÏ¿© ±× Ãë¾à¼ºÀ» µµÃâÇÏ¿´´Ù. ±× °á°ú 3ÃàÀº Àü¹ÝÀûÀ¸·Î Ãë¾à¼ºÀÌ ¸¹¾Ò°í, ÇÑ¹Ì ¸ÂÃãÇü ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«Àº »ó´ëÀûÀ¸·Î Ãë¾à¼ºÀÌ Àû¾úÀ¸³ª ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ÇÙ¿ì»ê Á¦°ø¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ½Å·Ú¼º, ¼±Á¦Å¸°ÝÀÇ ½ÇÇà·Â, Çٹ̻çÀÏ ¹æ¾î´É·Â µî¿¡¼ ÀûÁö ¾Ê´Â Ãë¾à¼ºÀÌ ¹ß°ßµÇ¾ú´Ù.
ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ °á°ú¸¦ Åä´ë·Î ÃÖ¼ÒÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ°³¹ß ÀÎÇÁ¶ó¸¦ ±¸Ãà, »óȲ°ú Á¶°Ç¿¡ ±âÃÊÇÑ ¹Ì ÇÙ¿ì»ê Àü·ÂÀÇ ´Ü°èº° ¹èÄ¡, ¼±Á¦Å¸°ÝÀÇ ½ÇÇà·Â Çâ»ó, Á¦2ÀÇ KAMD ±¸Ãà, ÇÑ¹Ì °£ ¸¶Âû ÇØ¼Ò ¹æ¾È, Çѱ¹Çü ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«(KNDS) µîÀ» Ãë¾à¼ºÀ» º¸¿ÏÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ´ë¾ÈÀ¸·Î Á¦½ÃÇÏ¿´´Ù. |
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If North Korea continues to develop its nuclear program in current trend, we will face the end-state of North Korea¡¯s nuclear threat. The purpose of this study is to analyse the ROK military¡¯s readiness posture for the end-state of North Korea¡¯s nuclear threat and identify weak points to make up them. To that end, the study focuses on the analysis of
3K (Kill Chain, KAMD, and KMPR) and Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) which are considered to be the two pillars of the ROK¡¯s defense system against the North Korea thereat. The study concludes that 3K has an overall weakness when considered from different perspectives. Although TDS presents relatively less weakness than 3K, there are still remained doubts about the reliability of U.S. unclear umbrella, the executive ability of preemptive strikes, and the defense capability for nuclear missile. Based on these findings, this study recommends that we need to supplement the identified areas of weakness, such as the establishment of nuclear program infrastructure, the phased-deployment of U.S. nuclear umbrellas based on circumstances and conditions, the improvement of executive power of preemptive strikes, the establishment of the second KAMD, the methods to settle any discord between ROK and U.S., and Korean Nuclear Deterrence Strategy (KNDS).
* Key Words: North Korea Nuclear Threat, 3K Strategy, ROK-US Tailored Deterrence Strategy, Nuclear Umbrellas of U.S., Preemptive Strikes, Korean Nuclear Deterrence Strategy |
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ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÃÖÁ¾»óÅ ÇÙ À§Çù Æò°¡¿Í Çѱ¹ÀÇ ±º»ç´ëºñż¼ º¸¿Ï |
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The Evaluation of North Korea¡¯s End State Nuclear Threat and ROK¡¯s Readiness Posture |
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2017 |
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ºÏÇÑ ÇÙ À§Çù, 3Ãà Àü·«, ÇÑ¹Ì ¸ÂÃãÇü ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«, ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ÇÙ¿ì»ê, ¼±Á¦Å¸°Ý, Çѱ¹Çü ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦Àü·« |
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ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ °³¹ßÀÌ ÇöÀç Ãß¼¼´ë·Î °è¼ÓµÈ´Ù¸é, ¸ÓÁö¾Ê¾Æ ¿ì¸®´Â ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÃÖÁ¾»óÅ ÇÙ À§Çù¿¡ Á÷¸éÇÏ°Ô µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
º» ¿¬±¸´Â ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÃÖÁ¾»óÅ ÇÙ À§Çù¿¡ ´ëºñÇÑ ¿ì¸® ±ºÀÇ ±º»ç´ëºñż¼¸¦ Áø´ÜÇÏ¿© ±× Ãë¾à¼ºÀ» º¸¿ÏÇϴµ¥ ¿¬±¸ÀÇ ¸ñÀûÀ» µÎ¾ú´Ù. À̸¦ À§ÇØ ¸ÕÀú ºÏÇÑ ÇÙ À§Çù¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Çѱ¹±ºÀÇ ¾ç´ë ´ëºñÃ¥ÀÎ 3Ãà Àü·«°ú ÇÑ¹Ì ¸ÂÃãÇü ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«À» ÁýÁßÀûÀ¸·Î ºÐ¼®ÇÏ¿© ±× Ãë¾à¼ºÀ» µµÃâÇÏ¿´´Ù. ±× °á°ú 3ÃàÀº Àü¹ÝÀûÀ¸·Î Ãë¾à¼ºÀÌ ¸¹¾Ò°í, ÇÑ¹Ì ¸ÂÃãÇü ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«Àº »ó´ëÀûÀ¸·Î Ãë¾à¼ºÀÌ Àû¾úÀ¸³ª ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ÇÙ¿ì»ê Á¦°ø¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ½Å·Ú¼º, ¼±Á¦Å¸°ÝÀÇ ½ÇÇà·Â, Çٹ̻çÀÏ ¹æ¾î´É·Â µî¿¡¼ ÀûÁö ¾Ê´Â Ãë¾à¼ºÀÌ ¹ß°ßµÇ¾ú´Ù.
ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ °á°ú¸¦ Åä´ë·Î ÃÖ¼ÒÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ°³¹ß ÀÎÇÁ¶ó¸¦ ±¸Ãà, »óȲ°ú Á¶°Ç¿¡ ±âÃÊÇÑ ¹Ì ÇÙ¿ì»ê Àü·ÂÀÇ ´Ü°èº° ¹èÄ¡, ¼±Á¦Å¸°ÝÀÇ ½ÇÇà·Â Çâ»ó, Á¦2ÀÇ KAMD ±¸Ãà, ÇÑ¹Ì °£ ¸¶Âû ÇØ¼Ò ¹æ¾È, Çѱ¹Çü ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«(KNDS) µîÀ» Ãë¾à¼ºÀ» º¸¿ÏÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ´ë¾ÈÀ¸·Î Á¦½ÃÇÏ¿´´Ù. |
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If North Korea continues to develop its nuclear program in current trend, we will face the end-state of North Korea¡¯s nuclear threat. The purpose of this study is to analyse the ROK military¡¯s readiness posture for the end-state of North Korea¡¯s nuclear threat and identify weak points to make up them. To that end, the study focuses on the analysis of
3K (Kill Chain, KAMD, and KMPR) and Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) which are considered to be the two pillars of the ROK¡¯s defense system against the North Korea thereat. The study concludes that 3K has an overall weakness when considered from different perspectives. Although TDS presents relatively less weakness than 3K, there are still remained doubts about the reliability of U.S. unclear umbrella, the executive ability of preemptive strikes, and the defense capability for nuclear missile. Based on these findings, this study recommends that we need to supplement the identified areas of weakness, such as the establishment of nuclear program infrastructure, the phased-deployment of U.S. nuclear umbrellas based on circumstances and conditions, the improvement of executive power of preemptive strikes, the establishment of the second KAMD, the methods to settle any discord between ROK and U.S., and Korean Nuclear Deterrence Strategy (KNDS).
* Key Words: North Korea Nuclear Threat, 3K Strategy, ROK-US Tailored Deterrence Strategy, Nuclear Umbrellas of U.S., Preemptive Strikes, Korean Nuclear Deterrence Strategy |
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2. ºÏÇÑ ÇÙ¡¤¹Ì»çÀÏ À§ÇùÀÇ ¹«·ÂÈ(ÙíÕôûù) Àü·«
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ºÏÇÑ ÇÙ¡¤¹Ì»çÀÏ À§ÇùÀÇ ¹«·ÂÈ(ÙíÕôûù) Àü·« |
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Strategy for Neutralization of North Korea¡¯s Nuclear and Missile Threat |
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ºÏÇÙ¹«±âÀÇ ¼ÒÇüÈ¡¤°æ·®È¡¤Ç¥ÁØÈ¿Í ¸ÓÁö¾ÊÀº ICBM ÀçÁøÀÔ ±â¼úÈ®º¸ ½Ã ÅëÁ¦ºÒ´É »çÅ¿¡ Á÷¸éÇÏ°Ô µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. Àç¾ÓÀû ÇÙÀüÀïÀ» ¿¹¹æÇϱâ À§ÇØ ºÏÇÑÇÙÀ» ¹«·ÂȽÃŰ´Â Àü·«Àû ¼±ÅÃÀ» ÇÒ ¼ö¹Û¿¡ ¾ø´Â »óȲÀÌ ¿¹»óµÈ´Ù. ºÏÇÑ ÀüÀïÁöµµºÎ µî Àü·«Àû Á߽ɰú ÁöÈÖÅëÁ¦Åë½Å¸ÁÀ» ¹«·ÂÈÇÏ°í »ó¡Àû ÇÙ¡¤¹Ì»çÀÏ ½Ã¼³À» ÃÊÅäȽÃŰ´Â Àü·«ÀÌ ¿ä±¸µÈ´Ù. À̸¦ À§Çؼ´Â ±¹°¡¾Èº¸½Ç¿¡ ÄÁÆ®·ÑŸ¿ö·Î¼ ºÏÇÙ´ëÀÀTF¸¦ ¿î¿ëÇϰí, 3Ãà ü°èÀÇ Á¶±â Àü·ÂȰ¡ ½Ã±ÞÇÏ´Ù. Àü·«»ç·ÉºÎ¸¦ â¼³ÇÏ¿© ºÏÇÙ¡¤¹Ì»çÀÏ À§Çù ´ëÀÀÀü·«À» ¼ö¸³Çϰí WMDÁ¦°ÅÀÛÀüÀ» ¼öÇàÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï ÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ Àü¸éÀüÀ» °¢¿ÀÇÑ ±¹¹ÎÀû °á±â°¡ ÇÊ¿äÇÏ´Ù. ±¹¹ÎÀÇ ¾ÈÀü°ú ¿µÅä ¼öÈ£¸¦ À§ÇÑ ±º»ç·Â ¿î¿ëÀÇ ÀÚÀ²¼ºÀ» ¹ßÈÖÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±ÇÀ» ȸº¹ÇØ¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
µ¿¸ÍÂ÷¿ø¿¡¼ ÃßÁøÇÒ ºÐ¾ß´Â ºÏÇÙ¡¤¹Ì»çÀÏ À§Çù¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀνÄÀ» °øÀ¯Çϰí, ÇÑ¹Ì °£ ±º»çÇൿ¿¡ µû¸¥ ÀÓ¹«¿Í ¿ªÇÒ µî ÀÛÀü ¼öÇàüÁ¦¸¦ ±¸ÃàÇϸç, Çٹ̻çÀÏ À§Çù Á¦°ÅÀÇ Àý¹Ú¼ºÀ» Àü·«Ä¿¹Â´ÏÄÉÀ̼ÇÀ» ÅëÇØ ÇÑ¹Ì ¾ç±¹ ±¹¹Î°ú ±¹Á¦»çȸÀÇ °ø°¨´ë ¸¦ È®º¸ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ È®Àü¹æÁöÃ¥À» °±¸ÇÑ »óÅ¿¡¼, ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ¡¤¹Ì»çÀÏ °ø°Ý¡ÈÄ ¶Ç´Â Àü¸éÀü ¡ÈÄ Æ÷Âø ½Ã, ÇÑ¹Ì ´ëÅë·É °£ ÇÕÀÇÇÏ¿¡ ±º»çÇൿÀ» ½Ç½ÃÇØ ¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. |
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The neutralization of North Korea¡¯s nuclear weapon system as part of a strategic selection should be undertaken in order to prevent any future possible catastrophic nuclear warfare. This is part of an over-reaching attitude and consensus that will never allow North Korea to exist in the international sphere as a nuclear state.
In order to implement such a strategy, a nuclear task force operating as a control tower should be established at the National Security Office for the President. In particular, the early modernization of the ROK¡¯s three vital pillars Strategic Command should also be activated in order tor develop a response strategy against North Korea¡¯s nuclear and missile threats as well as conducting WMD elimination operations. Moreover, the transition of wartime operational control should be conducted in order to restore the autonomy of military action and national determination.
In terms of the alliance perspective, our two allies should recognize North Korea¡¯s nuclear and missile threat, and the military operations system including the mission and role of the ROK-U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff should be established. Strategic communication should be conducted in order to secure a consensus on the inevitability and urgency concerning the elimination of North Korea¡¯s nuclear and missile systems. In addition, the substantial deployment of war fighting capabilities in order to prevent any escalation of war should be reinforced. The national command consisting of the two presidents of South Korea and America will be in a position to carry out military action in the event of any identification or clear-cut indicators of North Korea¡¯s nuclear or missile attack or total war. The operational employment of the recently deployed THAAD battery should also be conducted.
Key Words : Neutralization, Preemptive Strike, Strategic Command, Transition of Wartime Operational Control, National Command |
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ºÏÇÑ ÇÙ¡¤¹Ì»çÀÏ À§ÇùÀÇ ¹«·ÂÈ(ÙíÕôûù) Àü·« |
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Strategy for Neutralization of North Korea¡¯s Nuclear and Missile Threat |
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ºÏÇÙ¹«±âÀÇ ¼ÒÇüÈ¡¤°æ·®È¡¤Ç¥ÁØÈ¿Í ¸ÓÁö¾ÊÀº ICBM ÀçÁøÀÔ ±â¼úÈ®º¸ ½Ã ÅëÁ¦ºÒ´É »çÅ¿¡ Á÷¸éÇÏ°Ô µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. Àç¾ÓÀû ÇÙÀüÀïÀ» ¿¹¹æÇϱâ À§ÇØ ºÏÇÑÇÙÀ» ¹«·ÂȽÃŰ´Â Àü·«Àû ¼±ÅÃÀ» ÇÒ ¼ö¹Û¿¡ ¾ø´Â »óȲÀÌ ¿¹»óµÈ´Ù. ºÏÇÑ ÀüÀïÁöµµºÎ µî Àü·«Àû Á߽ɰú ÁöÈÖÅëÁ¦Åë½Å¸ÁÀ» ¹«·ÂÈÇÏ°í »ó¡Àû ÇÙ¡¤¹Ì»çÀÏ ½Ã¼³À» ÃÊÅäȽÃŰ´Â Àü·«ÀÌ ¿ä±¸µÈ´Ù. À̸¦ À§Çؼ´Â ±¹°¡¾Èº¸½Ç¿¡ ÄÁÆ®·ÑŸ¿ö·Î¼ ºÏÇÙ´ëÀÀTF¸¦ ¿î¿ëÇϰí, 3Ãà ü°èÀÇ Á¶±â Àü·ÂȰ¡ ½Ã±ÞÇÏ´Ù. Àü·«»ç·ÉºÎ¸¦ â¼³ÇÏ¿© ºÏÇÙ¡¤¹Ì»çÀÏ À§Çù ´ëÀÀÀü·«À» ¼ö¸³Çϰí WMDÁ¦°ÅÀÛÀüÀ» ¼öÇàÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï ÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ Àü¸éÀüÀ» °¢¿ÀÇÑ ±¹¹ÎÀû °á±â°¡ ÇÊ¿äÇÏ´Ù. ±¹¹ÎÀÇ ¾ÈÀü°ú ¿µÅä ¼öÈ£¸¦ À§ÇÑ ±º»ç·Â ¿î¿ëÀÇ ÀÚÀ²¼ºÀ» ¹ßÈÖÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±ÇÀ» ȸº¹ÇØ¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
µ¿¸ÍÂ÷¿ø¿¡¼ ÃßÁøÇÒ ºÐ¾ß´Â ºÏÇÙ¡¤¹Ì»çÀÏ À§Çù¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀνÄÀ» °øÀ¯Çϰí, ÇÑ¹Ì °£ ±º»çÇൿ¿¡ µû¸¥ ÀÓ¹«¿Í ¿ªÇÒ µî ÀÛÀü ¼öÇàüÁ¦¸¦ ±¸ÃàÇϸç, Çٹ̻çÀÏ À§Çù Á¦°ÅÀÇ Àý¹Ú¼ºÀ» Àü·«Ä¿¹Â´ÏÄÉÀ̼ÇÀ» ÅëÇØ ÇÑ¹Ì ¾ç±¹ ±¹¹Î°ú ±¹Á¦»çȸÀÇ °ø°¨´ë ¸¦ È®º¸ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ È®Àü¹æÁöÃ¥À» °±¸ÇÑ »óÅ¿¡¼, ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ¡¤¹Ì»çÀÏ °ø°Ý¡ÈÄ ¶Ç´Â Àü¸éÀü ¡ÈÄ Æ÷Âø ½Ã, ÇÑ¹Ì ´ëÅë·É °£ ÇÕÀÇÇÏ¿¡ ±º»çÇൿÀ» ½Ç½ÃÇØ ¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. |
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The neutralization of North Korea¡¯s nuclear weapon system as part of a strategic selection should be undertaken in order to prevent any future possible catastrophic nuclear warfare. This is part of an over-reaching attitude and consensus that will never allow North Korea to exist in the international sphere as a nuclear state.
In order to implement such a strategy, a nuclear task force operating as a control tower should be established at the National Security Office for the President. In particular, the early modernization of the ROK¡¯s three vital pillars Strategic Command should also be activated in order tor develop a response strategy against North Korea¡¯s nuclear and missile threats as well as conducting WMD elimination operations. Moreover, the transition of wartime operational control should be conducted in order to restore the autonomy of military action and national determination.
In terms of the alliance perspective, our two allies should recognize North Korea¡¯s nuclear and missile threat, and the military operations system including the mission and role of the ROK-U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff should be established. Strategic communication should be conducted in order to secure a consensus on the inevitability and urgency concerning the elimination of North Korea¡¯s nuclear and missile systems. In addition, the substantial deployment of war fighting capabilities in order to prevent any escalation of war should be reinforced. The national command consisting of the two presidents of South Korea and America will be in a position to carry out military action in the event of any identification or clear-cut indicators of North Korea¡¯s nuclear or missile attack or total war. The operational employment of the recently deployed THAAD battery should also be conducted.
Key Words : Neutralization, Preemptive Strike, Strategic Command, Transition of Wartime Operational Control, National Command |
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3. Æ®·³ÇÁ ÇàÁ¤ºÎÀÇ ÃÖ´ë ¾Ð¹Ú ¹× °ü¿© Á¤Ã¥ - Ư¡ ․ ÇѰè ․ ¿ì¼±¼øÀ§ -
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Æ®·³ÇÁ ÇàÁ¤ºÎÀÇ ÃÖ´ë ¾Ð¹Ú ¹× °ü¿© Á¤Ã¥ - Ư¡ ․ ÇѰè ․ ¿ì¼±¼øÀ§ - |
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The Maximum Pressure and Engagement Policy of the Trump Administration: Features, Limitations, and P |
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ÀÌ ±ÛÀº Æ®·³ÇÁ ÇàÁ¤ºÎ°¡ Á¦½ÃÇÑ ÃÖ´ëÇÑÀÇ ¾Ð¹Ú°ú °ü¿© Á¤Ã¥À̶õ °ú¿¬ ¹«¾ùÀÎÁö¸¦ ºÐ¼®ÇØ º¸°í ¼¼ºÎ ³»¿ë¿¡ ´ëÇØ ÀÌÇØ ´ç»çÀÚ(stake holder)µéÀº ¾î¶² ¿ì¼±¼øÀ§¸¦ °¡Áö°í ÀÖ´ÂÁö¸¦ Á¦½ÃÇϴµ¥ ±× ¸ñÀûÀÌ ÀÖ´Ù. ÃÖ´ëÇÑÀÇ ¾Ð¹Ú°ú °ü¿©Á¤Ã¥ÀÇ ¼¼ºÎ ¿É¼ÇÀº Å©°Ô 5°¡Áö·Î ´ëº°µÈ´Ù. Á¦Àç °È, ·¹Áü üÀÎÁö, ¼±Á¦°ø°Ý, ÇÙ µ¿°á, ±×¸®°í Áß±¹ ¿ªÇÒ·ÐÀÌ´Ù.
°¢ ¿É¼ÇÀº ¿É¼Çº° Ư¡°ú ÇÔ²² ÇѰèÁ¡µµ °¡Áö°í ÀÖ´Ù. µû¶ó¼ ÀÌÇØ´ç»çÀÚÀÇ ¿É¼Çº° ¼±È£µµ´Â ´Ù¸¦ ¼ö¹Û¿¡ ¾ø´Ù. Çѱ¹°ú ¹Ì±¹Àº Á¦Àç°È¿Í Áß±¹ ¿ªÇÒ·ÐÀ» ¼±È£ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¹Ý¸é, ºÏÇѰú Áß±¹Àº ÇÙ µ¿°áÀ» ¼±È£ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ÀÌ´Â ºÏÇÑÀ» ºñÇÙȽÃ۰íÀÚ ÇÏ´Â Æ®·³ÇÁ ÇàÁ¤ºÎÀÇ ´ëºÏÁ¤Ã¥ÀÌ °áÄÚ ½±Áö ¾ÊÀº °úÁ¤À̶ó´Â °ÍÀ» º¸¿©ÁØ´Ù. Çѱ¹ÀÇ Â÷±â Á¤ºÎ´Â ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ 5°¡Áö ¿É¼Çº° ´ëºñÃ¥À» ¸¶·ÃÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. |
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The purpose of this article is to analyze what the maximum pressure and engagement policy presented by the Trump Administration is and to show how stakeholders prioritize the details of this policy. There are five major options for maximum pressure and engagement policy. Five options are sanctions reinforcement, regime change, preemptive attack, nuclear freeze, and China¡¯s role.
Each option has limitations as well as optional features. Therefore, interest preferences of stakeholders are different. While South Korea and the United States prefer strengthening sanctions and China¡¯s role, North Korea and China can favor nuclear freeze. This shows that the Trump Administration¡¯s North Korea policy to denuclearize North Korea is a difficult process. The next government in Korea will have to prepare measures for each option.
Key Words: Maximum Pressure and Engagement, Options, Features and Limitations, Stakeholders, Trump Administration, Policy to North Korea |
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Æ®·³ÇÁ ÇàÁ¤ºÎÀÇ ÃÖ´ë ¾Ð¹Ú ¹× °ü¿© Á¤Ã¥ - Ư¡ ․ ÇѰè ․ ¿ì¼±¼øÀ§ - |
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The Maximum Pressure and Engagement Policy of the Trump Administration: Features, Limitations, and P |
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ÃÖ´ë ¾Ð¹Ú ¹× °ü¿©, ¿É¼Ç, Ư¡°ú ÇѰè, ÀÌÇØ ´ç»çÀÚ, Æ®·³ÇÁ ÇàÁ¤ºÎ, ´ëºÏÁ¤Ã¥ |
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ÀÌ ±ÛÀº Æ®·³ÇÁ ÇàÁ¤ºÎ°¡ Á¦½ÃÇÑ ÃÖ´ëÇÑÀÇ ¾Ð¹Ú°ú °ü¿© Á¤Ã¥À̶õ °ú¿¬ ¹«¾ùÀÎÁö¸¦ ºÐ¼®ÇØ º¸°í ¼¼ºÎ ³»¿ë¿¡ ´ëÇØ ÀÌÇØ ´ç»çÀÚ(stake holder)µéÀº ¾î¶² ¿ì¼±¼øÀ§¸¦ °¡Áö°í ÀÖ´ÂÁö¸¦ Á¦½ÃÇϴµ¥ ±× ¸ñÀûÀÌ ÀÖ´Ù. ÃÖ´ëÇÑÀÇ ¾Ð¹Ú°ú °ü¿©Á¤Ã¥ÀÇ ¼¼ºÎ ¿É¼ÇÀº Å©°Ô 5°¡Áö·Î ´ëº°µÈ´Ù. Á¦Àç °È, ·¹Áü üÀÎÁö, ¼±Á¦°ø°Ý, ÇÙ µ¿°á, ±×¸®°í Áß±¹ ¿ªÇÒ·ÐÀÌ´Ù.
°¢ ¿É¼ÇÀº ¿É¼Çº° Ư¡°ú ÇÔ²² ÇѰèÁ¡µµ °¡Áö°í ÀÖ´Ù. µû¶ó¼ ÀÌÇØ´ç»çÀÚÀÇ ¿É¼Çº° ¼±È£µµ´Â ´Ù¸¦ ¼ö¹Û¿¡ ¾ø´Ù. Çѱ¹°ú ¹Ì±¹Àº Á¦Àç°È¿Í Áß±¹ ¿ªÇÒ·ÐÀ» ¼±È£ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¹Ý¸é, ºÏÇѰú Áß±¹Àº ÇÙ µ¿°áÀ» ¼±È£ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ÀÌ´Â ºÏÇÑÀ» ºñÇÙȽÃ۰íÀÚ ÇÏ´Â Æ®·³ÇÁ ÇàÁ¤ºÎÀÇ ´ëºÏÁ¤Ã¥ÀÌ °áÄÚ ½±Áö ¾ÊÀº °úÁ¤À̶ó´Â °ÍÀ» º¸¿©ÁØ´Ù. Çѱ¹ÀÇ Â÷±â Á¤ºÎ´Â ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ 5°¡Áö ¿É¼Çº° ´ëºñÃ¥À» ¸¶·ÃÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. |
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The purpose of this article is to analyze what the maximum pressure and engagement policy presented by the Trump Administration is and to show how stakeholders prioritize the details of this policy. There are five major options for maximum pressure and engagement policy. Five options are sanctions reinforcement, regime change, preemptive attack, nuclear freeze, and China¡¯s role.
Each option has limitations as well as optional features. Therefore, interest preferences of stakeholders are different. While South Korea and the United States prefer strengthening sanctions and China¡¯s role, North Korea and China can favor nuclear freeze. This shows that the Trump Administration¡¯s North Korea policy to denuclearize North Korea is a difficult process. The next government in Korea will have to prepare measures for each option.
Key Words: Maximum Pressure and Engagement, Options, Features and Limitations, Stakeholders, Trump Administration, Policy to North Korea |
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4. ÀüÀïÃʱâ À庴ÀÇ ½É¸®Àû ¾ÈÁ¤°ú ÀüÀÇ °í¾ç ¹æ¾È
ÀÌ»óº¹
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ÀüÀïÃʱâ À庴ÀÇ ½É¸®Àû ¾ÈÁ¤°ú ÀüÀÇ °í¾ç ¹æ¾È |
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A Study on the Psychological Stability of Soldiers in the Early Stage War and Improvement Plan to Up |
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Ãâ ó |
Çѱ¹±º»ç Á¦1È£ |
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2017 |
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ÀüÀå½É¸®, ÀüÀÇ °í¾ç, ÀüÅõÀÇÁö, Á¤½Å±³À°, ÀüÀåȯ°æ |
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ÃÖ±Ù ¿ì¸® ±ºÀÇ Ãʱް£ºÎµéÀÌ ¿ì¼öÇÑ ¿ª·®À» °®Ãß°í ÀÖÀ¸³ª, ÀüÅõ°æÇèÀÇ ºÎÀç,
ºÎ´ë°ü¸® Â÷¿øÀÇ ±³À°ÈÆ·ÃÀ¸·Î ÀÎÇÑ ÀüÀå»óȲ Àå¾Ç´É·Â°ú ÀüÅõÁöÈÖ ´É·ÂÀÇ Ãë¾à
À¸·Î À̵鿡 ´ëÇÑ ¹è¾çÀÌ Àý½ÇÈ÷ ¿ä±¸µÇ°í ÀÖ´Ù.
º» ³í¹®Àº ÀüÀå ȯ°æÀÇ Æ¯¼º°ú ÀüÀå½É¸®, ÀüÅõ»ç·ÊÀÇ ±³ÈÆÀ» µµÃâÇÔÀ¸·Î½á ÀüÀï
Ãʱâ À庴µéÀÇ ½É¸®Àû ¾ÈÁ¤À» À¯ÁöÇϰí Àû°ú ½Î¿ö ÀÌ ±æ¼ö ÀÖ´Â È¿°úÀûÀÎ ÀüÀÇ °í¾ç ¹æ¾ÈÀ» Á¦½ÃÇϴµ¥ ¸ñÀûÀÌ ÀÖ´Ù.
ÀüÀï Ãʱ⠽ɸ®Àû ¾ÈÁ¤°ú ÀüÀÇ °í¾çÀ» À§Çؼ´Â ¸ÕÀú ÀüÀåÀÇ Æ¯¼º°ú ÀüÀå¿¡¼ÀÇ Àΰ£½É¸®¸¦ ÀÌÇØÇϰí, Àü½Ã¿¡ ÅëÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÀüÀåÀûÀÀÈÆ·ÃÀÌ ¿ä±¸µÈ´Ù. ƯÈ÷ ÀüÀï Ãʱâ À庴µéÀÇ ½É¸®Àû ¾ÈÁ¤À» À§ÇÑ ÀüÅõÀÇÁö ±³À°Àº Æò½Ã¿¡ ºÎ´ÜÇÑ ´ëÀû°ü È®¸³À» À§ÇÑ Á¤½Å±³À°°ú Àü½Ã´ëºñ ±³À°ÈÆ·Ã, »ýȰȱ³À°, »ç»ý°ü È®¸³À» À§ÇÑ Á¾±³È°µ¿ µîÀ» ÅëÇØ¼ °£Á¢°æÇèÀ» ´õ¿í È®ÃæÇØ ³ª°¡¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ ½ÇÀü¿¡¼ ¹ß»ýÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¿©·¯ °¡Áö ºÎÀûÀÀ Çö»óÀ» ±Øº¹Çϱâ À§ÇÑ Àü¹®ÀûÀÎ ¿¬±¸±â°üÀ» Á¶¼ºÇϰí, Çѹݵµ ÀüÀåȯ°æ°ú ¿ì¸® ±ºÀÇ Æ¯¼º¿¡ ¸Â´Â ü°èÀûÀÎ ¿¬±¸°¡ ÀÌ·ç¾îÁ®¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. |
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Recently, the junior officers of our military have excellent competence, but they lack combat experience, training, and unit management training. So we urgently need to cultivate their abilities to control battlefield situation and combat command ability.
The purpose of this study is to present the effective characteristics of the battlefield to protect the psychological stability of soldiers at the beginning of the war and the effective improvement plan to uplift to fighting spirit.
For the psychological stability and the fighting spirit, we need to understand the characteristics of the battlefield and human psychology on the battlefield, and also to make battle adaptation training to battle environment in the early stage of the war. In particular, it is necessary to expand the indirect experience through the mental education, the education for the wartime education, the education for the living, and the religious
activities for establishing the living quarters.
In addition, we need prepare to establish a professional research base to overcome various maladjustment phenomena. we also need to under take systematic research in accordance with the characteristics of military environment on the Korean peninsula.
Key Words: Battlefield Psychology, Uplifting Fighting Spirit, Will to Fight, Mental Education, Battlefield Environment |
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ÀüÀïÃʱâ À庴ÀÇ ½É¸®Àû ¾ÈÁ¤°ú ÀüÀÇ °í¾ç ¹æ¾È |
Á¦ ¸ñ [¿µ¹®] |
A Study on the Psychological Stability of Soldiers in the Early Stage War and Improvement Plan to Up |
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Çѱ¹±º»ç Á¦1È£ |
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2017 |
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ÀüÀå½É¸®, ÀüÀÇ °í¾ç, ÀüÅõÀÇÁö, Á¤½Å±³À°, ÀüÀåȯ°æ |
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ÃÖ±Ù ¿ì¸® ±ºÀÇ Ãʱް£ºÎµéÀÌ ¿ì¼öÇÑ ¿ª·®À» °®Ãß°í ÀÖÀ¸³ª, ÀüÅõ°æÇèÀÇ ºÎÀç,
ºÎ´ë°ü¸® Â÷¿øÀÇ ±³À°ÈÆ·ÃÀ¸·Î ÀÎÇÑ ÀüÀå»óȲ Àå¾Ç´É·Â°ú ÀüÅõÁöÈÖ ´É·ÂÀÇ Ãë¾à
À¸·Î À̵鿡 ´ëÇÑ ¹è¾çÀÌ Àý½ÇÈ÷ ¿ä±¸µÇ°í ÀÖ´Ù.
º» ³í¹®Àº ÀüÀå ȯ°æÀÇ Æ¯¼º°ú ÀüÀå½É¸®, ÀüÅõ»ç·ÊÀÇ ±³ÈÆÀ» µµÃâÇÔÀ¸·Î½á ÀüÀï
Ãʱâ À庴µéÀÇ ½É¸®Àû ¾ÈÁ¤À» À¯ÁöÇϰí Àû°ú ½Î¿ö ÀÌ ±æ¼ö ÀÖ´Â È¿°úÀûÀÎ ÀüÀÇ °í¾ç ¹æ¾ÈÀ» Á¦½ÃÇϴµ¥ ¸ñÀûÀÌ ÀÖ´Ù.
ÀüÀï Ãʱ⠽ɸ®Àû ¾ÈÁ¤°ú ÀüÀÇ °í¾çÀ» À§Çؼ´Â ¸ÕÀú ÀüÀåÀÇ Æ¯¼º°ú ÀüÀå¿¡¼ÀÇ Àΰ£½É¸®¸¦ ÀÌÇØÇϰí, Àü½Ã¿¡ ÅëÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÀüÀåÀûÀÀÈÆ·ÃÀÌ ¿ä±¸µÈ´Ù. ƯÈ÷ ÀüÀï Ãʱâ À庴µéÀÇ ½É¸®Àû ¾ÈÁ¤À» À§ÇÑ ÀüÅõÀÇÁö ±³À°Àº Æò½Ã¿¡ ºÎ´ÜÇÑ ´ëÀû°ü È®¸³À» À§ÇÑ Á¤½Å±³À°°ú Àü½Ã´ëºñ ±³À°ÈÆ·Ã, »ýȰȱ³À°, »ç»ý°ü È®¸³À» À§ÇÑ Á¾±³È°µ¿ µîÀ» ÅëÇØ¼ °£Á¢°æÇèÀ» ´õ¿í È®ÃæÇØ ³ª°¡¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ ½ÇÀü¿¡¼ ¹ß»ýÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¿©·¯ °¡Áö ºÎÀûÀÀ Çö»óÀ» ±Øº¹Çϱâ À§ÇÑ Àü¹®ÀûÀÎ ¿¬±¸±â°üÀ» Á¶¼ºÇϰí, Çѹݵµ ÀüÀåȯ°æ°ú ¿ì¸® ±ºÀÇ Æ¯¼º¿¡ ¸Â´Â ü°èÀûÀÎ ¿¬±¸°¡ ÀÌ·ç¾îÁ®¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. |
ÃÊ ·Ï [¿µ¹®] |
Recently, the junior officers of our military have excellent competence, but they lack combat experience, training, and unit management training. So we urgently need to cultivate their abilities to control battlefield situation and combat command ability.
The purpose of this study is to present the effective characteristics of the battlefield to protect the psychological stability of soldiers at the beginning of the war and the effective improvement plan to uplift to fighting spirit.
For the psychological stability and the fighting spirit, we need to understand the characteristics of the battlefield and human psychology on the battlefield, and also to make battle adaptation training to battle environment in the early stage of the war. In particular, it is necessary to expand the indirect experience through the mental education, the education for the wartime education, the education for the living, and the religious
activities for establishing the living quarters.
In addition, we need prepare to establish a professional research base to overcome various maladjustment phenomena. we also need to under take systematic research in accordance with the characteristics of military environment on the Korean peninsula.
Key Words: Battlefield Psychology, Uplifting Fighting Spirit, Will to Fight, Mental Education, Battlefield Environment |
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5. Ȱµ¿À̷п¡ ±Ù°ÅÇÑ 6¡¤25 ÀüÀï Àü»çÀÚ À¯Çع߱¼ ¿¬µ¿Ã¼°è ºÐ¼®
ÁÖ°æ¹è, ³ë´ë±Õ, ¿ÀÅÂÈ
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Ȱµ¿À̷п¡ ±Ù°ÅÇÑ 6¡¤25 ÀüÀï Àü»çÀÚ À¯Çع߱¼ ¿¬µ¿Ã¼°è ºÐ¼® |
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An Analysis of Interworking System of the Recovery Project of Korean War Remains based on Activity T |
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ÁÖ°æ¹è, ³ë´ë±Õ, ¿ÀÅÂÈ |
Ãâ ó |
Çѱ¹±º»ç Á¦1È£ |
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2017 |
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À¯Çع߱¼, Ȱµ¿ÀÌ·Ð, À¯Çع߱¼°¨½Ä´Ü, 6°³ÀÇ ÇÙ½ÉÀûÀÎ °³³ä, Á¤Ã¥¼ö¸³ |
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º» ³í¹®Àº 6¡¤25 ÀüÀï Àü»çÀÚ À¯ÇØ ¹ß±¼ »ç¾÷ÀÌ ´Ù¾çÇÑ ¹æÇâÀ¸·Î ¿¬±¸°¡ µÉ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï ±âÃÊÀûÀÎ ¸ðµ¨À» Á¦½ÃÇÔÀ¸·Î½á À¯Çع߱¼ »ç¾÷ÀÇ È°¼ºÈ¿Í ±¹°¡ Á¤Ã¼¼ºÀ» È®¸³Çϴµ¥ ÀÖ´Ù.
Ȱµ¿ÀÌ·Ð(Activity theory)¿¡ ±Ù°ÅÇØ¼ À¯Çع߱¼ »ç¾÷À» ºÐ¼®Çغ¸¸é, À¯Çع߱¼ °¨½Ä´ÜÀ̶ó´Â ÁÖü(Subject)´Â ´ëÇѹα¹ Á¤ºÎ¶ó°í ÇÏ´Â °øµ¿Ã¼(Community)ÀÇ Áö¿øÀ» ¹Þ¾Æ, À¯Çع߱¼»ç¾÷À» ÅëÇØ Àü»çÀÚµéÀÇ ³ÌÀ» À§·ÎÇÏ°í ¸í¿¹¸¦ °í¾çÇÏ·Á´Â ¸ñÀû(Object)À» °¡Áö°í ÀÖÀ¸¸ç, ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¸ñÀûÀ» ´Þ¼ºÇϰí À¯Çع߱¼ »ç¾÷ÀÇ È°¼ºÈ¸¦ À§Çؼ À¯Çع߱¼°¨½Ä´ÜÀº ¹ß±¼¡¤°¨½Ä ±â¼ú·Â°ú Àü¹® Àη Ȯº¸¡¤¾ç¼ºÀ» µµ±¸(Tools)·Î »ï¾Æ, ´ëÇѹα¹ Á¤ºÎ´Â ¹ý·É¡¤Á¦µµ¡¤Áö¿ø°ú »ç¾÷¼öÇࡤÆò°¡¶ó´Â °ü°èÀÇ ±ÔÄ¢(Rules)°ú ´ë±¹¹Î ¼Ò°³¿Í È«º¸, ±×¸®°í ³²¡¤ºÏ ¹× ±¹Á¦±³·ùÇù·ÂÀ̶ó´Â ºÐ¾÷(Division of labor) µî 6°³ÀÇ ÇÙ½ÉÀûÀÎ °³³äÀ» µµÃâÇØ³¾ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù.
ÀÌ ¿¬±¸´Â ÇâÈÄ À¯Çع߱¼ »ç¾÷ Á¤Ã¥¼ö¸³ ½Ã¿¡´Â ÀÌ 6°³ÀÇ ÇÙ½ÉÀûÀÎ °³³äÀ» À¯±âÀûÀ¸·Î °í·ÁÇÔÀ» Á¦¾ÈÇÑ´Ù. |
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This article purports to offer direction of the further development of the project through basic model which will lead to establishing our own national identity and vitalization of the recovery of Korean War remains project.
Analysis result of the project based on ¡°Activity Theory¡± shows that MND Agency for KIA Recovery & Identification ¡°MAKRI¡± as a ¡®Subject¡¯acts towards an ¡®Object¡¯ of honoring, recognizing, and commemorating the fallen heroes with the help of a supportive ¡®Community¡¯, namely the Korean government and the citizens. It explains that MAKRI uses ¡®excavation and forensic technology¡¯ and ¡®maintenance and training experts¡¯ as its own
¡®Tools¡¯ to achieve the goal. It also explains that the relations between the government and the citizen built on the foundation of ¡®laws, policies and supports¡¯ and ¡®execution and assessment¡¯ known as ¡®Rules¡¯ interact according to the ¡®Division of labor¡¯, such as ¡®national public relations and education¡¯, as well as ¡®inter-Korean relations and international exchange¡¯. This six main structures helps to support and enhance the vitalization of the project.
The aforementioned six key elements should be carefully concerned with policy making for Project of Recovery of Korean War Remains.
Keywords: Recovery of Remains, Activity Theory, MND Agency for KIA Recovery & Identification, Six Key Elements for Recovery & Identification of War Remains, Policy Making |
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Ȱµ¿À̷п¡ ±Ù°ÅÇÑ 6¡¤25 ÀüÀï Àü»çÀÚ À¯Çع߱¼ ¿¬µ¿Ã¼°è ºÐ¼® |
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An Analysis of Interworking System of the Recovery Project of Korean War Remains based on Activity T |
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ÁÖ°æ¹è, ³ë´ë±Õ, ¿ÀÅÂÈ |
Ãâ ó |
Çѱ¹±º»ç Á¦1È£ |
¹ßÇà ³âµµ |
2017 |
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À¯Çع߱¼, Ȱµ¿ÀÌ·Ð, À¯Çع߱¼°¨½Ä´Ü, 6°³ÀÇ ÇÙ½ÉÀûÀÎ °³³ä, Á¤Ã¥¼ö¸³ |
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º» ³í¹®Àº 6¡¤25 ÀüÀï Àü»çÀÚ À¯ÇØ ¹ß±¼ »ç¾÷ÀÌ ´Ù¾çÇÑ ¹æÇâÀ¸·Î ¿¬±¸°¡ µÉ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï ±âÃÊÀûÀÎ ¸ðµ¨À» Á¦½ÃÇÔÀ¸·Î½á À¯Çع߱¼ »ç¾÷ÀÇ È°¼ºÈ¿Í ±¹°¡ Á¤Ã¼¼ºÀ» È®¸³Çϴµ¥ ÀÖ´Ù.
Ȱµ¿ÀÌ·Ð(Activity theory)¿¡ ±Ù°ÅÇØ¼ À¯Çع߱¼ »ç¾÷À» ºÐ¼®Çغ¸¸é, À¯Çع߱¼ °¨½Ä´ÜÀ̶ó´Â ÁÖü(Subject)´Â ´ëÇѹα¹ Á¤ºÎ¶ó°í ÇÏ´Â °øµ¿Ã¼(Community)ÀÇ Áö¿øÀ» ¹Þ¾Æ, À¯Çع߱¼»ç¾÷À» ÅëÇØ Àü»çÀÚµéÀÇ ³ÌÀ» À§·ÎÇÏ°í ¸í¿¹¸¦ °í¾çÇÏ·Á´Â ¸ñÀû(Object)À» °¡Áö°í ÀÖÀ¸¸ç, ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¸ñÀûÀ» ´Þ¼ºÇϰí À¯Çع߱¼ »ç¾÷ÀÇ È°¼ºÈ¸¦ À§Çؼ À¯Çع߱¼°¨½Ä´ÜÀº ¹ß±¼¡¤°¨½Ä ±â¼ú·Â°ú Àü¹® Àη Ȯº¸¡¤¾ç¼ºÀ» µµ±¸(Tools)·Î »ï¾Æ, ´ëÇѹα¹ Á¤ºÎ´Â ¹ý·É¡¤Á¦µµ¡¤Áö¿ø°ú »ç¾÷¼öÇࡤÆò°¡¶ó´Â °ü°èÀÇ ±ÔÄ¢(Rules)°ú ´ë±¹¹Î ¼Ò°³¿Í È«º¸, ±×¸®°í ³²¡¤ºÏ ¹× ±¹Á¦±³·ùÇù·ÂÀ̶ó´Â ºÐ¾÷(Division of labor) µî 6°³ÀÇ ÇÙ½ÉÀûÀÎ °³³äÀ» µµÃâÇØ³¾ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù.
ÀÌ ¿¬±¸´Â ÇâÈÄ À¯Çع߱¼ »ç¾÷ Á¤Ã¥¼ö¸³ ½Ã¿¡´Â ÀÌ 6°³ÀÇ ÇÙ½ÉÀûÀÎ °³³äÀ» À¯±âÀûÀ¸·Î °í·ÁÇÔÀ» Á¦¾ÈÇÑ´Ù. |
ÃÊ ·Ï [¿µ¹®] |
This article purports to offer direction of the further development of the project through basic model which will lead to establishing our own national identity and vitalization of the recovery of Korean War remains project.
Analysis result of the project based on ¡°Activity Theory¡± shows that MND Agency for KIA Recovery & Identification ¡°MAKRI¡± as a ¡®Subject¡¯acts towards an ¡®Object¡¯ of honoring, recognizing, and commemorating the fallen heroes with the help of a supportive ¡®Community¡¯, namely the Korean government and the citizens. It explains that MAKRI uses ¡®excavation and forensic technology¡¯ and ¡®maintenance and training experts¡¯ as its own
¡®Tools¡¯ to achieve the goal. It also explains that the relations between the government and the citizen built on the foundation of ¡®laws, policies and supports¡¯ and ¡®execution and assessment¡¯ known as ¡®Rules¡¯ interact according to the ¡®Division of labor¡¯, such as ¡®national public relations and education¡¯, as well as ¡®inter-Korean relations and international exchange¡¯. This six main structures helps to support and enhance the vitalization of the project.
The aforementioned six key elements should be carefully concerned with policy making for Project of Recovery of Korean War Remains.
Keywords: Recovery of Remains, Activity Theory, MND Agency for KIA Recovery & Identification, Six Key Elements for Recovery & Identification of War Remains, Policy Making |
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6. ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙÀü·«°ú Àá¼öÇԹ߻çźµµ¹Ì»çÀÏ(SLBM)À§ÇùºÐ¼®À» ÅëÇÑ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ´ëÀÀÀü·«
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Á¦ ¸ñ [±¹¹®] |
ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙÀü·«°ú Àá¼öÇԹ߻çźµµ¹Ì»çÀÏ(SLBM)À§ÇùºÐ¼®À» ÅëÇÑ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ´ëÀÀÀü·« |
Á¦ ¸ñ [¿µ¹®] |
South Korea¡¯s Response Strategy through Analysis ofNorth Korea¡¯s Nuclear Strategy and Submarine-Laun |
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¹ÚÀç¿Ï |
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Çѱ¹±º»ç Á¦1È£ |
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2017 |
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ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«, SLBM, ¼öÁß Å³Ã¼ÀÎ, ¿øÀÚ·ÂÃßÁøÀá¼öÇÔ, ´ëÀáÀü |
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º» ³í¹®Àº ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«À» °íÂûÇϰí, Á¡ÁõÇÏ´Â ºÏÇÑÀÇ Çٴɷ°ú ¹Ì»çÀÏ,
Àá¼öÇÔ À§Çù µî SLBM À§ÇùÀ» ºÐ¼®Çϰí Çѱ¹ÀÇ ´ëÀÀÀü·«À» ¸ð»öÇϱâ À§ÇØ ÀÛ¼º
µÇ¾ú´Ù. ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«À» ÇÙ¹«±â º¸À¯¼öÁذú ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦ ÇüÅ·Π°íÂûÇÏ¿´´Ù.
ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«Àº ÇÙ¹«±â º¸À¯¸¸À¸·Î ¾ïÁ¦µÇ´Â ½ÇÁ¸¾ïÁ¦Àü·«¿¡¼ ÀÌÁ¦´Â
SLBM¿¡ ÇÙ¹«±â¸¦ ÀåÂøÇÏ¿© ¾ïÁ¦ÇÏ·Á´Â ÃÖ¼Ò¾ïÁ¦Àü·«À¸·Î º¯°æµÇ°í ÀÖ´Â °ÍÀ¸
·Î ÆÇ´ÜµÈ´Ù.
ºÏÇÑ SLBMÀÇ Àü·«Àû ÇÔÀÇ´Â SLBMÀÇ Àº¹Ð¼ºÀ» Ȱ¿ëÇÏ¿© ÃÖ¼Ò¾ïÁ¦´É·ÂÀ» È®º¸
Çϱâ À§ÇÔÀ̸ç, ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙÀ§Çù ¹üÀ§°¡ È®´ëµÇ´Â °ÍÀ» ÀǹÌÇÑ´Ù. ±×¸®°í ÇÑ¡¤¹Ìµ¿¸Í°ú ¸ÂÃãÇü È®Àå¾ïÁ¦ÀÇ 4D¿Í ųüÀÎ, KAMD°¡ ¹«·ÂȵǴ À§±â¿¡ óÇÏ°Ô µÇ¾î ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÁÖµµ±Ç Àå¾Ç°ú °¾ÐÀÌ ¿¹»óµÈ´Ù.
Çѱ¹Àº ºÏÇÑÀÇ SLBM À§Çù¿¡ ´ëÀÀÇϱâ À§ÇØ ´ëÀáÀÛÀü ´É·Â °È µî SLBM ´ëÀÀ°³³äÀ» ȹ±âÀûÀ¸·Î ¹ßÀü½ÃÄÑ¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ±×¸®°í ¼öÁß Å³Ã¼ÀÎ º¸°°ú ¿øÀÚ·ÂÃßÁøÀá¼öÇÔÀÇ Àü·ÂÈ¿¡ ´ëÇØ¼µµ ±àÁ¤ÀûÀ¸·Î °ËÅäÇØ¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ±×¸®°í SLBM¿ä°ÝÀ» À§ÇÑ ÇØ»ó ¿ä°Ýü°è ±¸Ãà°ú ºÏÇÑÀÇ ºñÇÙÈ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÇÁö¸¦ õ¸íÇϱâ À§Çؼ¶óµµ ºÏÇÑ Çٴɷ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¼±Á¦Å¸°ÝÀ» Àû±ØÀûÀ¸·Î °ËÅäÇÏ´Â µî ´Ù¾çÇÏ°í ´Éµ¿ÀûÀÎ ´ëÀÀÀü·«ÀÌ ¿ä±¸µÇ´Â »óȲÀ̶ó°í ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù. |
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This paper is designed to examine the North Korean nuclear deterrent strategy and to present Korea¡¯s submarine launched ballistic missile countermeasures strategy through the analysis of North Korea¡¯s (SLBM) threat.
In it, the nuclear repression strategy of North Korea has been examined through the form of nuclear deterrence according to the level of possession of nuclear weapons. It also analyzes the strategic implications of the North Korean SLBM by looking at the North Korean nuclear, missile and submarine threats for the North Korean SLBM threat.
Of the strategic implications of North Korea¡¯s SLBM are North Korea¡¯s attempt to secure minimum suppression capability through SLBM¡¯s secrecy and to expand the scope of North Korea¡¯s nuclear threat. Upon North Korea¡¯s successful attempt, it is expected that the 4D of the ROK-US alliance and tailored expansion suppression, the Kill Chain and the KAMD are at risk of being useless and that North Korea will take the lead in inter-Korean relations.
Therefore, South Korea needs to drastically improve the concept of SLBM countermeasures to cope with the increasing threat of North Korea¡¯s severe SLBM. It should also positively examine the reinforcement of underwater kill Chain and Nuclear Powered Submersible Ship.
In addition, South Korea is required to consider more diverse and aggressive response strategy, including the establishment of a maritime interceptor system for SLBM interception and a preemption strike on North Korea¡¯s nuclear capability to declare its firm will.
Key Words: Nuclear Deterrent Strategy, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), Underwater Kill Chain, Nuclear Powered Submersible Ship, Anti-Submarine Warfare |
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Á¦ ¸ñ [±¹¹®] |
ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙÀü·«°ú Àá¼öÇԹ߻çźµµ¹Ì»çÀÏ(SLBM)À§ÇùºÐ¼®À» ÅëÇÑ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ´ëÀÀÀü·« |
Á¦ ¸ñ [¿µ¹®] |
South Korea¡¯s Response Strategy through Analysis ofNorth Korea¡¯s Nuclear Strategy and Submarine-Laun |
Àú ÀÚ |
¹ÚÀç¿Ï |
Ãâ ó |
Çѱ¹±º»ç Á¦1È£ |
¹ßÇà ³âµµ |
2017 |
ÁÖÁ¦ Ű¿öµå |
ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«, SLBM, ¼öÁß Å³Ã¼ÀÎ, ¿øÀÚ·ÂÃßÁøÀá¼öÇÔ, ´ëÀáÀü |
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º» ³í¹®Àº ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«À» °íÂûÇϰí, Á¡ÁõÇÏ´Â ºÏÇÑÀÇ Çٴɷ°ú ¹Ì»çÀÏ,
Àá¼öÇÔ À§Çù µî SLBM À§ÇùÀ» ºÐ¼®Çϰí Çѱ¹ÀÇ ´ëÀÀÀü·«À» ¸ð»öÇϱâ À§ÇØ ÀÛ¼º
µÇ¾ú´Ù. ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«À» ÇÙ¹«±â º¸À¯¼öÁذú ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦ ÇüÅ·Π°íÂûÇÏ¿´´Ù.
ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ ¾ïÁ¦Àü·«Àº ÇÙ¹«±â º¸À¯¸¸À¸·Î ¾ïÁ¦µÇ´Â ½ÇÁ¸¾ïÁ¦Àü·«¿¡¼ ÀÌÁ¦´Â
SLBM¿¡ ÇÙ¹«±â¸¦ ÀåÂøÇÏ¿© ¾ïÁ¦ÇÏ·Á´Â ÃÖ¼Ò¾ïÁ¦Àü·«À¸·Î º¯°æµÇ°í ÀÖ´Â °ÍÀ¸
·Î ÆÇ´ÜµÈ´Ù.
ºÏÇÑ SLBMÀÇ Àü·«Àû ÇÔÀÇ´Â SLBMÀÇ Àº¹Ð¼ºÀ» Ȱ¿ëÇÏ¿© ÃÖ¼Ò¾ïÁ¦´É·ÂÀ» È®º¸
Çϱâ À§ÇÔÀ̸ç, ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙÀ§Çù ¹üÀ§°¡ È®´ëµÇ´Â °ÍÀ» ÀǹÌÇÑ´Ù. ±×¸®°í ÇÑ¡¤¹Ìµ¿¸Í°ú ¸ÂÃãÇü È®Àå¾ïÁ¦ÀÇ 4D¿Í ųüÀÎ, KAMD°¡ ¹«·ÂȵǴ À§±â¿¡ óÇÏ°Ô µÇ¾î ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÁÖµµ±Ç Àå¾Ç°ú °¾ÐÀÌ ¿¹»óµÈ´Ù.
Çѱ¹Àº ºÏÇÑÀÇ SLBM À§Çù¿¡ ´ëÀÀÇϱâ À§ÇØ ´ëÀáÀÛÀü ´É·Â °È µî SLBM ´ëÀÀ°³³äÀ» ȹ±âÀûÀ¸·Î ¹ßÀü½ÃÄÑ¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ±×¸®°í ¼öÁß Å³Ã¼ÀÎ º¸°°ú ¿øÀÚ·ÂÃßÁøÀá¼öÇÔÀÇ Àü·ÂÈ¿¡ ´ëÇØ¼µµ ±àÁ¤ÀûÀ¸·Î °ËÅäÇØ¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ±×¸®°í SLBM¿ä°ÝÀ» À§ÇÑ ÇØ»ó ¿ä°Ýü°è ±¸Ãà°ú ºÏÇÑÀÇ ºñÇÙÈ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÇÁö¸¦ õ¸íÇϱâ À§Çؼ¶óµµ ºÏÇÑ Çٴɷ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¼±Á¦Å¸°ÝÀ» Àû±ØÀûÀ¸·Î °ËÅäÇÏ´Â µî ´Ù¾çÇÏ°í ´Éµ¿ÀûÀÎ ´ëÀÀÀü·«ÀÌ ¿ä±¸µÇ´Â »óȲÀ̶ó°í ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù. |
ÃÊ ·Ï [¿µ¹®] |
This paper is designed to examine the North Korean nuclear deterrent strategy and to present Korea¡¯s submarine launched ballistic missile countermeasures strategy through the analysis of North Korea¡¯s (SLBM) threat.
In it, the nuclear repression strategy of North Korea has been examined through the form of nuclear deterrence according to the level of possession of nuclear weapons. It also analyzes the strategic implications of the North Korean SLBM by looking at the North Korean nuclear, missile and submarine threats for the North Korean SLBM threat.
Of the strategic implications of North Korea¡¯s SLBM are North Korea¡¯s attempt to secure minimum suppression capability through SLBM¡¯s secrecy and to expand the scope of North Korea¡¯s nuclear threat. Upon North Korea¡¯s successful attempt, it is expected that the 4D of the ROK-US alliance and tailored expansion suppression, the Kill Chain and the KAMD are at risk of being useless and that North Korea will take the lead in inter-Korean relations.
Therefore, South Korea needs to drastically improve the concept of SLBM countermeasures to cope with the increasing threat of North Korea¡¯s severe SLBM. It should also positively examine the reinforcement of underwater kill Chain and Nuclear Powered Submersible Ship.
In addition, South Korea is required to consider more diverse and aggressive response strategy, including the establishment of a maritime interceptor system for SLBM interception and a preemption strike on North Korea¡¯s nuclear capability to declare its firm will.
Key Words: Nuclear Deterrent Strategy, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), Underwater Kill Chain, Nuclear Powered Submersible Ship, Anti-Submarine Warfare |
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7. Çѹݵµ ¾ÈÁ¤È ÀÛÀü½Ã È¿À²ÀûÀÎ Ä¡¾ÈÁú¼ À¯Áö ¹æ¾È¿¡ °üÇÑ ¿¬±¸
±èÀÀ¼ö
Á¦ ¸ñ [±¹¹®] |
Çѹݵµ ¾ÈÁ¤È ÀÛÀü½Ã È¿À²ÀûÀÎ Ä¡¾ÈÁú¼ À¯Áö ¹æ¾È¿¡ °üÇÑ ¿¬±¸ |
Á¦ ¸ñ [¿µ¹®] |
A Study on Efficient Application Plan for Security Elements in Stability Operations on the Korean Pe |
Àú ÀÚ |
±èÀÀ¼ö |
Ãâ ó |
Çѱ¹±º»ç Á¦1È£ |
¹ßÇà ³âµµ |
2017 |
ÁÖÁ¦ Ű¿öµå |
¼öº¹Áö¿ª, ¾ÈÁ¤È ÀÛÀü, Ä¡¾ÈÀ¯Áö±º, ÀÓ½ÃÄ¡¾ÈÀ§¿øÈ¸, ºÏÇÑÀÌÅ»ÁֹΠ|
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¿ì¸®´Â 6¡¤25 ÀüÀïÀ̳ª À̶óÅ©Àü Àü·Ê¸¦ ÅëÇÏ¿© ±º»çÀÛÀüÀÇ ½Â¸®¸¦ ´Þ¼ºÇÏ°íµµ
¾ÈÁ¤È ÀÛÀü¿¡ ½ÇÆÐÇÔÀ¸·Î½á Àüü ÀÛÀü±¹¸éÀÌ È¥¶õÀ» °ÞÀº »ç·Ê¸¦ °æÇèÇß´Ù. ¼ö
º¹Áö¿ªÀÇ ¼º°øÀûÀÎ Àç°ÇȰµ¿°úÁ¤¿¡ ÀÖ¾î¼ Ä¡¾ÈÁú¼ È®¸³Àº Çʼö ÀüÁ¦Á¶°ÇÀÌ´Ù.
¶ÇÇÑ µ¶ÀÏÀº ÅëÀÏ ÀÌÈÄ Ä¡¾ÈÁú¼ À¯Áö¸¦ À§ÇØ ¸¹Àº ³ë·ÂÀ» ÇßÁö¸¸ Á¤¼Àû À¶ÇÕÀÇ
ºÎÁ¶È µî ¸¹Àº ¹®Á¦Á¡µéÀÌ ³ëÁ¤µÇ¾ú´Ù. µû¶ó¼ ºÏÇÑÀÇ ¹ß»ý °¡´ÉÇÑ À§±â»óȲ¿¡
´ëºñÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ̾߸»·Î ½Ã´ëÀûÀ¸·Î ¸Å¿ì Áß¿äÇÑ °ú¾÷À̶ó ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ÀåÂ÷ ºÏÇÑ ¼öº¹Áö¿ª¿¡¼ ¾ÈÁ¤È ÀÛÀüÀ» ¼öÇàÇÒ °æ¿ì Àå±â°£ÀÇ À¯ÀÏüÁ¦¸¦ À¯ÁöÇØ¿Â ºÏÇÑÀÇ Æ¯¼öÇÑ È¯°æÀ¸·Î ÀÎÇØ À¯¹ßµÇ´Â Ä¡¾È¼ö¿ä´Â ´Ù¾çÇÏ°Ô Ç¥ÃâµÉ °ÍÀ¸·Î ¿¹»óµÈ´Ù.
º»°í¿¡¼´Â ºÏÇÑ ¼öº¹Áö¿ª¿¡¼ ¿¹»óµÇ´Â Ä¡¾Èȯ°æ ºÐ¼® ¹× ¹üÁË À¯ÇüÀ» »óÁ¤ÇÏ¿© È¿À²ÀûÀ¸·Î Ä¡¾ÈÀ» À¯ÁöÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ¹æ¾ÈÀ» ³íÀÇÇϰíÀÚ ÇÑ´Ù. µû¶ó¼ Ä¡¾ÈÀ¯Áö ±º°ú ÀÓ½ÃÄ¡¾ÈÀ§¿øÈ¸, Å»ºÏÀÚ Áß ±¹³» °ÅÁÖÀÚ È°¿ë, Àü½Ã Ä¡¾ÈȰµ¿À» ¼öÇàÇÏ°Ô µÉ °ü·Ã Á¶Á÷ÀÇ »çÀü Áغñ µî¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© ±¸Ã¼ÀûÀÎ ÀǰßÀ» Á¦½ÃÇϰíÀÚ ÇÑ´Ù.
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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has been making efforts to stabilize his regime after completing third-generation hereditary power succession.
However, current difficult realities that North Korea, known as a ¡°rogue state,¡± is facing may evolve in unpredictable ways.
We have witnessed cases such as the Korean War and the Iraq War in which countries went through chaos of the overall operational aspects due to the failure of stability operations despite of successful military operations.
To establish public peace and order is an essential prerequisite for successful reconstruction activities in reclaimed areas. In addition, after unification, Germany had a lot of hard work including reorganization of police forces in West Germany. However, many problems were raised by emotional disharmony between East and West German police officers. In this regard, it is very timely and important task for us to prepare for possible crisis
situations.
When we conduct stability operations in the reclaimed areas, it is very likely that we will face a great deal of difficulty with establishing public peace and order after the long-term tyranny.
This paper is to discuss efficient ways to maintain public peace and order in North Korea after unification by looking at expected public peace environments and crime types in the reclaimed areas of North Korea. It also examines more closely the utility of security forces and provisional security committee, the role of North Korea's defectors in South Korea, and the preliminary activities by police-related organizations during the war.
Key Words: Reclaimed area, Stability operations, Security Force, Provisional Security Committee, North Korean defectors in South Korea |
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Á¦ ¸ñ [±¹¹®] |
Çѹݵµ ¾ÈÁ¤È ÀÛÀü½Ã È¿À²ÀûÀÎ Ä¡¾ÈÁú¼ À¯Áö ¹æ¾È¿¡ °üÇÑ ¿¬±¸ |
Á¦ ¸ñ [¿µ¹®] |
A Study on Efficient Application Plan for Security Elements in Stability Operations on the Korean Pe |
Àú ÀÚ |
±èÀÀ¼ö |
Ãâ ó |
Çѱ¹±º»ç Á¦1È£ |
¹ßÇà ³âµµ |
2017 |
ÁÖÁ¦ Ű¿öµå |
¼öº¹Áö¿ª, ¾ÈÁ¤È ÀÛÀü, Ä¡¾ÈÀ¯Áö±º, ÀÓ½ÃÄ¡¾ÈÀ§¿øÈ¸, ºÏÇÑÀÌÅ»ÁֹΠ|
ÃÊ ·Ï [±¹¹®] |
¿ì¸®´Â 6¡¤25 ÀüÀïÀ̳ª À̶óÅ©Àü Àü·Ê¸¦ ÅëÇÏ¿© ±º»çÀÛÀüÀÇ ½Â¸®¸¦ ´Þ¼ºÇÏ°íµµ
¾ÈÁ¤È ÀÛÀü¿¡ ½ÇÆÐÇÔÀ¸·Î½á Àüü ÀÛÀü±¹¸éÀÌ È¥¶õÀ» °ÞÀº »ç·Ê¸¦ °æÇèÇß´Ù. ¼ö
º¹Áö¿ªÀÇ ¼º°øÀûÀÎ Àç°ÇȰµ¿°úÁ¤¿¡ ÀÖ¾î¼ Ä¡¾ÈÁú¼ È®¸³Àº Çʼö ÀüÁ¦Á¶°ÇÀÌ´Ù.
¶ÇÇÑ µ¶ÀÏÀº ÅëÀÏ ÀÌÈÄ Ä¡¾ÈÁú¼ À¯Áö¸¦ À§ÇØ ¸¹Àº ³ë·ÂÀ» ÇßÁö¸¸ Á¤¼Àû À¶ÇÕÀÇ
ºÎÁ¶È µî ¸¹Àº ¹®Á¦Á¡µéÀÌ ³ëÁ¤µÇ¾ú´Ù. µû¶ó¼ ºÏÇÑÀÇ ¹ß»ý °¡´ÉÇÑ À§±â»óȲ¿¡
´ëºñÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ̾߸»·Î ½Ã´ëÀûÀ¸·Î ¸Å¿ì Áß¿äÇÑ °ú¾÷À̶ó ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ÀåÂ÷ ºÏÇÑ ¼öº¹Áö¿ª¿¡¼ ¾ÈÁ¤È ÀÛÀüÀ» ¼öÇàÇÒ °æ¿ì Àå±â°£ÀÇ À¯ÀÏüÁ¦¸¦ À¯ÁöÇØ¿Â ºÏÇÑÀÇ Æ¯¼öÇÑ È¯°æÀ¸·Î ÀÎÇØ À¯¹ßµÇ´Â Ä¡¾È¼ö¿ä´Â ´Ù¾çÇÏ°Ô Ç¥ÃâµÉ °ÍÀ¸·Î ¿¹»óµÈ´Ù.
º»°í¿¡¼´Â ºÏÇÑ ¼öº¹Áö¿ª¿¡¼ ¿¹»óµÇ´Â Ä¡¾Èȯ°æ ºÐ¼® ¹× ¹üÁË À¯ÇüÀ» »óÁ¤ÇÏ¿© È¿À²ÀûÀ¸·Î Ä¡¾ÈÀ» À¯ÁöÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ¹æ¾ÈÀ» ³íÀÇÇϰíÀÚ ÇÑ´Ù. µû¶ó¼ Ä¡¾ÈÀ¯Áö ±º°ú ÀÓ½ÃÄ¡¾ÈÀ§¿øÈ¸, Å»ºÏÀÚ Áß ±¹³» °ÅÁÖÀÚ È°¿ë, Àü½Ã Ä¡¾ÈȰµ¿À» ¼öÇàÇÏ°Ô µÉ °ü·Ã Á¶Á÷ÀÇ »çÀü Áغñ µî¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© ±¸Ã¼ÀûÀÎ ÀǰßÀ» Á¦½ÃÇϰíÀÚ ÇÑ´Ù.
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ÃÊ ·Ï [¿µ¹®] |
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has been making efforts to stabilize his regime after completing third-generation hereditary power succession.
However, current difficult realities that North Korea, known as a ¡°rogue state,¡± is facing may evolve in unpredictable ways.
We have witnessed cases such as the Korean War and the Iraq War in which countries went through chaos of the overall operational aspects due to the failure of stability operations despite of successful military operations.
To establish public peace and order is an essential prerequisite for successful reconstruction activities in reclaimed areas. In addition, after unification, Germany had a lot of hard work including reorganization of police forces in West Germany. However, many problems were raised by emotional disharmony between East and West German police officers. In this regard, it is very timely and important task for us to prepare for possible crisis
situations.
When we conduct stability operations in the reclaimed areas, it is very likely that we will face a great deal of difficulty with establishing public peace and order after the long-term tyranny.
This paper is to discuss efficient ways to maintain public peace and order in North Korea after unification by looking at expected public peace environments and crime types in the reclaimed areas of North Korea. It also examines more closely the utility of security forces and provisional security committee, the role of North Korea's defectors in South Korea, and the preliminary activities by police-related organizations during the war.
Key Words: Reclaimed area, Stability operations, Security Force, Provisional Security Committee, North Korean defectors in South Korea |
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